This paper assesses the consequences of a high degree of international capital mobility for the behavior of governments. It is argued that countries can be seen as clubs where the government as club management acts as an entrepreneur attempting to attract internationally mobile resources. Within this stylized model it is shown that competition induces the government of a small democratic country to implement policy reforms that increase the welfare of domestic residents if it wants to be reelected. This result suggests that international openness may be a substitute for more overt attempts to contain a government's Leviathan tendencies such as constitutional amendments. Finally, the case against competition among governments is analyzed from the perspective of the club model developed in the paper.
Introduction
Economists tend to identify the domain of competition in the realm of politics with competition among political parties for votes.~ But at least since Friedrich List's treatise (1841) on the role of governments in promoting the interest of national industries economic thinking has also focused on aspects of intergovernmental competition. 2 Initially, mercantilism fostered the belief that governments are competing for scarce demand. But even then the notion existed that governments are rivals in seeking to attract mobile factors of production. In particular, as one moves to smaller and more open jurisdictions and as the mobility CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY of factors among these becomes high, the mercantilistic worry of gaining sufficient spending is replaced by the threat of exit or non-entry of mobile factors of production. Thus Adam Smith reflects on the harmful consequences of excessive taxes on mobile capital [1981 (1776) :848f.]:
The proprietor of stock is properly a citizen of the world, and is not necessarily attached to any particular country. He would be apt to abandon the country in which he was exposed to a vexatious inquisition, in order to be assessed to a burdensome tax, and would remove his stock to some other country where he could, either carry on his business, or enjoy his fortune more at ease. By removing his stock, he would put an end to all the industry which it had maintained in the country which he left. Stock cultivates land; stock employs labour. A tax which tended to drive away stock from any particular country, would so far tend to dry up every source of revenue, both to the sovereign and to the society.
The theme of this paper is the effect that competition among governments for mobile resources may have on government behaviour. For the main part my analysis is a positive one: I present a model that captures the situation of governments, voters and firms acting within a global economy characterized by a high mobility of capital. In the final part of the paper I turn to normative issues. Competition among governments for mobile resources has occasionally been said to lead to suboptimal outcomes. I discuss this criticism. Weighing both the pros and cons I end up siding with those who argue for less harmonization and more competition, a conclusion that I derive from the model presented.
I. Competition Among Governments: Elements of a Club Theoretic Framework
The main building blocks of the model are as follows: (I) Competition among governments is seen as the competition of immobile factors of production for internationally mobile capital (Giersch 1981).
(2) The entrepreneur in this competitive process is the government. Governments produce goods that owners of capital can use if they invest within the policy domain of the government. Economic policies and the institutional framework are seen as factors of production. Note that it is not important whether politicians are aware of their entrepreneurial role:
